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RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND SALVATION 
John Hick 
Let us approach the problems of religious pluralism through the claims of the different 
traditions to offer salvation-generically, the transfonnation of human existence from 
self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness. This approach leads to a recognition of the 
great world faiths as spheres of salvation; and so far as we can tell, more or less equally 
so. Their different truth-claims express (a) their differing perceptions, through different 
religio-cultural 'lenses,' of the one ultimate divine Reality; (b) their different answers to 
the boundary questions of origin and destiny, true answers to which are however not 
necessary for salvation, and (c) their different historical memories. 
I 
The fact that there is a plurality of religious traditions, each with its own distinctive 
beliefs, spiritual practices, ethical outlook, art fonns and cultural ethos, creates an 
obvious problem for those of us who see them, not simply as human phenomena, 
but as responses to the Divine. For each presents itself, implicitly or explicitly, as 
in some important sense absolute and unsurpassable and as rightly claiming a total 
allegiance. The problem of the relationship between these different streams of re-
ligious life has often been posed in tenns of their divergent belief-systems. For 
whilst there are various overlaps between their teachings there are also radical dif-
ferences: is the divine reality (let us refer to it as the Real) personal ornon-personal; 
if personal, is it unitary or triune; is the universe created, or emanated, or itself 
eternal; do we live only once on this earth or are we repeatedly reborn? and so on 
and so on. When the problem of understanding religious plurality is approached 
through these rival truth-claims it appears particularly intractable. 
I want to suggest, however, that it may more profitably be approached from a 
different direction, in tenns of the claims of the various traditions to provide, or to 
be effective contexts of, salvation. 'Salvation' is primarily a Christian tenn, though 
I shall use it here to include its functional analogues in the other major world tra-
ditions. In this broader sense we can say that both Christianity and these other 
faiths are paths of salvation. For whereas pre-axial religion was (and is) centrally 
concerned to keep life going on an even keel, the post-axial traditions, originating 
or rooted in the 'axial age' of the first millenium B.C.E.-principally Hinduism, 
Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam-are centrally concerned with a radical 
transfonnation of the human situation. 
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It is of course possible, in an alternative approach, to define salvation in such 
a way that it becomes a necessary truth that only one particular tradition can 
provide it. If, for example, from within Christianity we define salvation as being 
forgiven by God because of Jesus' atoning death, and so becoming part of God's 
redeemed community, the church, then salvation is by definition Christian salva-
tion. If on the other hand, from within Mahayana Buddhism, we define it as the 
attainment of satori or awakening, and so becoming an ego-free manifestation 
of the eternal Dharmakaya, then salvation is by definition Buddhist liberation. 
And so on. But if we stand back from these different conceptions to compare 
them we can, I think, very naturally and properly see them as different forms 
of the more fundamental conception of a radical change from a profoundly 
unsatisfactory state to one that is limitlessly better because rightly related to the 
Real. Each tradition conceptualizes in its own way the wrongness of ordinary 
human existence-as a state of fallenness from paradisal virtue and happiness, 
or as a condition of moral weakness and alienation from God, or as the fragmen-
tation of the infinite One into false individualities, or as a self-centeredness 
which pervasively poisons our involvement in the world process, making it to 
us an experience of anxious, unhappy unfulfillment. But each at the same time 
proclaims a limitlessly better possibility, again conceptualized in different ways-
as the joy of conforming one's life to God's law; as giving oneself to God in 
Christ, so that 'it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me' (Galatians 
2:20), leading to eternal life in God's presence; as a complete surrender (islam) 
to God, and hence peace with God, leading to the bliss of paradise; as transcending 
the ego and realizing oneness with the limitless being-consciousness-bliss (satch-
itananda) of Brahman; as overcoming the ego point of view and entering into 
the serene selflessness of nirvana. I suggest that these different conceptions of 
salvation are specifications of what, in a generic formula, is the transformation 
of human existence from self-centeredness to a new orientation, centered in the 
divine Reality. And in each case the good news that is proclaimed is that this 
limitlessly better possibility is actually available and can be entered upon, or 
begin to be entered upon, here and now. Each tradition sets forth the way to 
attain this great good: faithfulness to the Torah, discipleship to Jesus, obedient 
living out of the Qur' anic way of life, the Eightfold Path of the Buddhist dharma, 
or the three great Hindu margas of mystical insight, activity in the world, and 
self-giving devotion to God. 
II 
The great world religions, then, are ways of salvation. Each claims to constitute 
an effective context within which the transformation of human existence can and 
does take place from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness. How are we to 
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judge such claims? We cannot directly observe the inner spiritual quality of a hu-
man relationship to the Real; but we can observe how that relationship, as one's 
deepest and most pervasive orientation, affects the moral and spiritual quality of 
a human personality and of a man's or woman's relationship to others. It would 
seem, then, that we can only assess these salvation-projects insofar as we are able 
to observe their fruits in human life. The inquiry has to be, in a broad sense, empiri-
cal. For the issue is one of fact, even though hard to define and difficult to measure 
fact, rather than being settleable by a priori stipulation. 
The word 'spiritual' which occurs above is notoriously vague; but I am using it 
to refer to a quality or, better, an orientation which we can discern in those individ-
uals whom we call saints-a Christian term which I use here to cover such ana-
logues as arahat, bodhisattva, jivanmukti, mahatma. In these cases the human self 
is variously described as becoming part of the life of God, being 'to the Eternal 
Goodness what his own hand is to a man'; or being permeated from within by the 
infinite reality of Brahman; or becoming one with the eternal Buddha nature. There 
is a change in their deepest orientation from centeredness in the ego to a new cen-
tering in the Real as manifested in their own tradition. One is conscious in the 
presence of such a person that he or she is, to a startling extent, open to the tran-
scendent, so as to be largely free from self-centered concerns and anxieties and 
empowered to live as an instrument of God/Truth/Reality. 
It is to be noted that there are two main patterns of such a transformation. 
There are saints who withdraw from the world into prayer or meditation and 
saints who seek to change the world-in the medieval period a contemplative 
Julian of Norwich and a political Joan of Arc, or in our own century a mystical 
Sri Aurobindo and a political Mahatma Gandhi. In our present age of sociological 
consciousness, when we are aware that our inherited political and economic 
structures can be analyzed and purposefully changed, saintliness is more likely 
than in earlier times to take social and political forms. But, of whichever type, 
the saints are not a different species from the rest of us; they are simply much 
more advanced in the salvific transformation. 
The ethical aspect of this salvific transformation consists in observable modes 
of behavior. But how do we identify the kind of behavior which, to the degree 
that it characterizes a life, reflects a corresponding degree of reorientation to the 
divine Reality? Should we use Christian ethical criteria, or Buddhist, or Mus-
lim ... ? The answer, I suggest, is that at the level of their most basic moral 
insights the great traditions use a common criterion. For they agree in giving a 
central and normative role to the unselfish regard for others that we call love or 
compassion. This is commonly expressed in the principle of valuing others as 
we value ourselves, and treating them accordingly. Thus in the ancient Hindu 
Mahabharata we read that 'One should never do to another that which one would 
regard as injurious to oneself. This, in brief, is the rule of Righteousness' 
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(Anushana parva, 113:7). Again, 'He who ... benefits persons of all orders, 
who is always devoted to the good of all beings, who does not feel aversion to 
anybody ... succeeds in ascending to Heaven' (Anushana parva, 145:24). In 
the Buddhist SuUa Nipata we read, 'As a mother cares for her son, all her days, 
so towards all living things a man's mind should be all-embracing' (149). In the 
Jain scriptures we are told that one should go about 'treating all creatures in the 
world as he himself would be treated' (Kitanga Sutra, I.ii.33). Confucius, 
expounding humaneness (jen), said, 'Do not do to others what you would not 
like yourself' (Analects, xxi, 2). In a Taoist scripture we read that the good man 
will 'regard [others'] gains as if they were his own, and their losses in the same 
way' (Thai Shang, 3). The Zoroastrian scriptures declare, 'That nature only is 
good when it shall not do unto another whatever is not good for its own self' 
(Dadistan-i-dinik, 94:5). We are all familiar with Jesus' teaching, 'As ye would 
that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise' (Luke 6:31). In the 
Jewish Talmud we read 'What is hateful to yourself do not do to your fellow 
man. That is the whole of the Torah' (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbath 31a). And 
in the Hadith of Islam we read Muhammad's words, 'No man is a true believer 
unless he desires for his brother that which he desires for himself' (Ibn Madja, 
Intro. 9). Clearly, if everyone acted on this basic principle, taught by all the 
major faiths, there would be no injustice, no avoidable suffering, and the human 
family would everywhere live in peace. 
When we tum from this general principle of love/compassion to the actual 
behavior of people within the different traditions, wondering to what extent they 
live in this way, we realize how little research has been done on so important 
a question. We do not have much more to go on than general impressions, 
supplemented by travellers tales and anecdotal reports. We observe among our 
neighbors within our own community a great deal of practical loving-kindness; 
and we are told, for example, that a remarkable degree of self-giving love is to 
be found among the Hindu fishing families in the mud huts along the Madras 
shore; and we hear various other similar accounts from other lands. We read 
biographies, social histories and novels of Muslim village life in Africa, Buddhist 
life in Thailand, Hindu life in India, Jewish life in New York, as well as Christian 
life around the world, both in the past and today, and we get the impression that 
the personal virtues (as well as vices) are basically much the same within these 
very different religio-cultural settings and that in all of them unselfish concern 
for others occurs and is highly valued. And, needless to say, as well as love 
and compassion we also see all-too-abundantly, and apparently spread more or 
less equally in every society, cruelty, greed, hatred, selfishness and malice. 
All this constitutes a haphazard and impressionistic body of data. Indeed I 
want to stress, not how easy it is, but on the contrary how difficult it is, to make 
responsible judgments in this area. For not only do we lack full information, 
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND SALVATION 369 
but the fragmentary information that we have has to be interpreted in the light 
of the varying natural conditions of human life in different periods of history 
and in different economic and political circumstances. And I suggest that all that 
we can presently arrive at is the cautious and negative conclusion that we have 
no good reason to believe that anyone of the great religious traditions has proved 
itself to be more productive of love/compassion than another. 
The same is true when we tum to the large-scale social outworkings of the 
different salvation-projects. Here the units are not individual human lives, span-
ning a period of decades, but religious cultures spanning many centuries. For 
we can no more judge a civilization than a human life by confining our attention 
to a single temporal cross-section. Each of the great streams of religious life has 
had its times of flourishing and its times of deterioration. Each has produced its 
own distinctive kinds of good and its own distinctive kinds of evil. But to assess 
either the goods or the evils cross-culturally is difficult to say the least. How do 
we weigh, for example, the lack of economic progress, and consequent wide-
spread poverty, in traditional Hindu and Buddhist cultures against the endemic 
violence and racism of Christian civilization, culminating in the twentieth century 
Holocaust? How do we weigh what the west regards as the hollowness of arranged 
marriages against what the east regards as the hollowness of a marriage system 
that leads to such a high proportion of divorces and broken families? From within 
each culture one can see clearly enough the defects of the others. But an objective 
ethical comparison of such vast and complex totalities is at present an unattainable 
ideal. And the result is that we are not in a position to claim an over-all moral 
superiority for anyone of the great living religious traditions. 
Let us now see where we have arrived. I have suggested that if we identify 
the central claim of each of the great religious traditions as the claim to provide, 
or to be an effective context of, salvation; and if we see salvation as an actual 
change in human beings from self-centeredness to a new orientation centered in 
the ultimate divine Reality; and if this new orientation has both a more elusive 
'spiritual' character and a more readily observable moral aspect-then we arrive 
at the modest and largely negative conclusion that, so far as we can tell, no one 
of the great world religions is salvifically superior to the rest. 
III 
If this is so, what are we to make of the often contradictory doctrines of the 
different traditions? In order to make progress at this point, we must distinguish 
various kinds and levels of doctrinal conflict. 
There are, first, conceptions of the ultimate as lahweh, or the Holy Trinity, 
or Allah, or Shiva, or Vishnu, or as Brahman, or the Dharmakaya, the Tao, and 
so on. 
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If salvation is taking place, and taking place to about the same extent, within 
the religious systems presided over by these various deities and absolutes, this 
suggests that they are different manifestations to humanity of a yet more ultimate 
ground of all salvific transformation. Let us then consider the possibility that an 
infinite transcendent divine reality is being differently conceived, and therefore 
differently experienced, and therefore differently responded to from within our 
different religio-cultural ways of being human. This hypothesis makes sense of 
the fact that the salvific transformation seems to have been occurring in all the 
great traditions. Such a conception is, further, readily open to philosophical 
support. For we are familiar today with the ways in which human experience is 
partly formed by the conceptual and linguistic frameworks within which it occurs. 
The basically Kantian insight that the mind is active in perception, and that we 
are always aware of our environment as it appears to a consciousness operating 
with our particular conceptual resources and habits, has been amply confirmed 
by work in cognitive psychology and the sociology of knowledge and can now 
be extended with some confidence to the analysis of religious awareness. If, 
then, we proceed inductively from the phenomenon of religious experience around 
the world, adopting a religious as distinguished from a naturalistic interpretation 
of it, we are likely to find ourselves making two moves. The first is to postulate 
an ultimate transcendent divine reality (which I have been referring to as the 
Real) which, being beyond the scope of our human concepts, cannot be directly 
experienced by us as it is in itself but only as it appears through our various 
human thought-forms. And the second is to identify the thought-and-experienced 
deities and absolutes as different manifestations of the Real within different 
historical forms of human consciousness. In Kantian terms, the divine noumenon, 
the Real an sich, is experienced through different human receptivities as a range 
of divine phenomena, in the formation of which religious concepts have played 
an essential part. 
These different 'receptivities' consist of conceptual schemas within which 
various personal, communal and historical factors have produced yet further 
variations. The most basic concepts in terms of which the Real is humanly 
thought-and-experienced are those of (personal) deity and of the (non-personal) 
absolute. But the Real is not actually experienced either as deity in general or 
as the absolute in general. Each basic concept becomes (in Kantian terminology) 
schematized in more concrete form. It is at this point that individual and cultural 
factors enter the process. The religious tradition of which we are a part, with 
its history and ethos and its great exemplars, its scriptures feeding our thoughts 
and emotions, and perhaps above all its devotional or meditative practices, 
constitutes an uniquely shaped and coloured 'lens' through which we are con-
cretely aware of the Real specifically as the personal Adonai, or as the Heavenly 
Father, or as Allah, or Vishnu, or Shiva ... or again as the non-personal 
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Brahman, or Dharmakaya, or the Void or the Ground. . Thus, one who uses 
the forms of Christian prayer and sacrament is thereby led to experience the Real 
as the divine Thou, whereas one who practices advaitic yoga or Buddhist zazen 
is thereby brought to experience the Real as the infinite being-consciousness-bliss 
of Brahman, or as the limitless emptiness of sunyata which is at the same time 
the infinite fullness of immediate reality as 'wondrous being.' 
Three explanatory comments at this point before turning to the next level of 
doctrinal disagreement. First, to suppose that the experienced deities and absolutes 
which are the intentional objects of worship or content of religious meditation, 
are appearances or manifestations of the Real, rather than each being itself the 
Real an sich, is not to suppose that they are illusions-any more than the varying 
ways in which a mountain may appear to a plurality of differently placed observers 
are illusory. That the same reality may be variously experienced and described 
is true even of physical objects. But in the case of the infinite, transcendent 
divine reality there may well be much greater scope for the use of varying human 
conceptual schemas producing varying modes of phenomenal experience. 
Whereas the concepts in terms of which we are aware of mountains and rivers 
and houses are largely (though by no means entirely) standard throughout the 
human race, the religious concepts in terms of which we become aware of the 
Real have developed in widely different ways within the different cultures of 
the earth. 
As a second comment, to say that the Real is beyond the range of our human 
concepts is not intended to mean that it is beyond the scope of purely formal, 
logically generated concepts-such as the concept of being beyond the range of 
(other than purely formal) concepts. We would not be able to refer at all to that 
which cannot be conceptualized in any way, not even by the concept of being 
unconceptualizable! But the other than purely formal concepts by which our 
experience is structured must be presumed not to apply to its noumenal ground. 
The characteristics mapped in thought and language are those that are constitutive 
of human experience. We have no warrant to apply them to the noumenal ground 
of the phenomenal, i.e., experienced, realm. We should therefore not think of 
the Real an sich as singular or plural, substance or process, personal or non-per-
sonal, good or bad, purposive or non-purpose. This has long been a basic theme 
of religious thought. For example, within Christianity, Gregory of Nyssa declared 
that: 
The simplicity of the True Faith assumes God to be that which He is, 
namely, incapable of being grasped by any term, or any idea, or any 
other device of our apprehension, remaining beyond the reach not only 
of the human but of the angelic and all supramundane intelligence, 
unthinkable, unutterable, above all expression in words, having but one 
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name that can represent His proper nature, the single name being "Above 
Every Name" (Against Eunomius, I, 42). 
Augustine, continuing this tradition, said that 'God transcends even the mind' 
(True Religion, 36:67), and Aquinas that 'by its immensity, the divine substance 
surpasses every fonn that our intellect reaches' (Contra Gentiles, I, 14, 3). In 
Islam the Qur'an affinns that God is 'beyond what they describe' (6:101). The 
Upanishads declare of Brahman, 'There the eye goes not, speech goes not, nor 
the mind' (Kena Up., 1, 3), and Shankara wrote that Brahman is that 'before 
which words recoil, and to which no understanding has ever attained' (Otto, 
Mysticism East and West, E. T. 1932, p. 28). 
But, third, we might well ask, why postulate an ineffable and unobservable 
divine-reality-in-itself? If we can say virtually nothing about it, why affinn its 
existence? The answer is that the reality or non-reality of the postulated noumenal 
ground of the experienced religious phenomena constitutes the difference between 
a religious and a naturalistic interpretation of religion. If there is no such trans-
cendent ground, the various fonns of religious experience have to be categorized 
as purely human projections. If on the other hand there is such a transcendent 
ground, then these phenomena may be joint products of the universal presence 
of the Real and of the varying sets of concepts and images that have crystallized 
within the religious traditions of the earth. To affinn the transcendent is thus to 
affinn that religious experience is not solely a construction of the human imag-
ination but is a response-though always culturally conditioned-to the Real. 
Those doctrinal conflicts, then, that embody different conceptions of the ulti-
mate arise, according to the hypothesis I am presenting, from the variations 
between different sets of human conceptual schema and spiritual practice. And 
it seems that each of these varying ways of thinking-and-experiencing the Real 
has been able to mediate its transfonning presence to human life. For the different 
major concepts of the ultimate do not seem-so far as we can tell-to result in 
one religious totality being soteriologically more effective than another. 
IV 
The second level of doctrinal difference consists of metaphysical beliefs which 
cohere with although they are not exclusively linked to a particular conception 
of the ultimate. These are beliefs about the relation of the material universe to 
the Real: creation ex nihilo, emanation, an eternal universe, an unknown fonn 
of dependency ... ? And about human destiny: reincarnation or a single life, 
eternal identity or transcendence of the self . . . ? Again, there are questions 
about the existence of heavens and hells and purgatories and angels and devils 
and many other subsidiary states and entities. Out of this mass of disputed 
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religious issues let me pick two major examples: is the universe created ex nihilo, 
and do human beings reincarnate? 
I suggest that we would do well to apply to such questions a principle that was 
taught by the Buddha two and a half millennia ago. He listed a series of 'undeter-
mined questions' (avyakata)-whether the universe is eternal, whether it is spa-
tially infinite, whether (putting it in modem terms) mind and brain are identical, 
and what the state is of a completed project of human existence (a Tathagata) after 
bodily death. He refused to answer these questions, saying that we do not need to 
have knowledge of these things in order to attain liberation or awakening (nirvana); 
and indeed that to regard such information as soteriologically essential would only 
divert us from the single-minded quest for liberation. I think that we can at this 
point profitable learn from the Buddha, even extending his conception of the unde-
termined questions further than he did-for together with almost everyone else in 
his own culture he regarded one of our examples, reincarnation, as a matter of 
assured knowledge. Let us, then, accept that we do not know whether, e.g., the 
universe was created ex nihilo, nor whether human beings are reincarnated; and, 
further, that it is not necessary for salvation to hold a correct opinion on either 
matter. 
I am not suggesting that such issues are unimportant. On their own level they 
are extremely important, being both of great interest to us and also having widely 
ramifying implications within our belief-systems and hence for our lives. The 
thought of being created out of nothing can nourish a salutary sense of absolute 
dependence. (But other conceptions can also nurture that sense.) The idea of 
reincarnation can offer the hope of future spiritual progress; though, combined 
with the principle of karma, it can also serve to validate the present inequalities 
of human circumstances. (But other eschatologies also have their problems, both 
theoretical and practical). Thus these-and other-disputed issues do have a 
genuine importance. Further, it is possible that some of them may one day be 
settled by empirical evidence. It might become established, for example, that 
the 'big bang' of some fifteen billion years ago was an absolute beginning, thus 
ruling out the possibility that the universe is eternal. And again, it might become 
established, by an accumulation of evidence, that reincarnation does indeed occur 
in either some or all cases. On the other hand it is possible that we shall never 
achieve agreed knowledge in these areas. Certainly, at the present time, whilst 
we have theories, preferences, hunches, inherited convictions, we cannot honestly 
claim to have secure knowledge. And the same is true, I suggest, of the entire 
range of metaphysical issues about which the religions dispute. They are of 
intense interest, properly the subject of continuing research and discussion, but 
are not matters concerning which absolute dogmas are appropriate. Still less is 
it appropriate to maintain that salvation depends upon accepting some one par-
ticular opinion or dogma. We have seen that the transformation of human exist-
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ence from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness seems to be taking place 
within each of the great traditions despite their very different answers to these 
debated questions. It follows that a correct opinion concerning them is not 
required for salvation. 
v 
The third level of doctrinal disagreement concerns historical questions. Each 
of the great traditions includes a larger or smaller body of historical beliefs. In 
the case of Judaism these include at least the main features of the history described 
in the Hebrew scriptures; in the case of Christianity, these plus the main features 
of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus as described in the New Testament; 
in the case of Islam, the main features of the history described in the Qur'an; 
in the case of Vaishnavite Hinduism, the historicity of Krishna; in the case of 
Buddhism, the historicity of Guatama and his enlightenment at Bodh Gaya; and 
so on. But although each tradition thus has its own records of the past, there 
are rather few instances of direct disagreement between these. For the strands 
of history that are cherished in these different historical memories do not generally 
overlap; and where they do overlap they do not generally involve significant 
differences. The overlaps are mainly within the thread of ancient near eastern 
history that is common to the Jewish, Christian and Muslim scriptures; and 
within this I can only locate two points of direct disagreement-the Torah's 
statement that Abraham nearly sacrificed his son Isaac at Mount Moriah (Genesis 
22) versus the Muslim interpretation of the Qur'anic version (in Sura 37) that it 
was his other son Ishmael; and the New Testament witness that Jesus died on 
the cross versus the Qur' anic teaching that 'they did not slay him, neither crucified 
him, only a likeness of that was shown them' (Sura 4:156). (This latter however 
would seem to be a conflict between an historical report, in the New Testament, 
and a theological inference-that God would not allow so great a prophet to be 
killed-in the Qur'an.) 
All that one can say in general about such disagreements, whether between 
two traditions or between anyone of them and the secular historians, is that they 
could only properly be settled by the weight of historical evidence. However, 
the events in question are usually so remote in time, and the evidence so slight 
or so uncertain, that the question cannot be definitively settled. We have to be 
content with different communal memories, enriched as they are by the mythic 
halo that surrounds all long-lived human memories of events of transcendent 
significance. Once again, then, I suggest that differences of historical judgment, 
although having their own proper importance, do not prevent the different tradi-
tions from being effective, and so far as we can tell equally effective, contexts 
of salvation. It is evidently not necessary for salvation to have correct historical 
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information. (It is likewise not necessary for salvation, we may add, to have 
correct scientific information.) 
VI 
Putting all this together, the picture that I am suggesting can be outlined as 
follows: our human religious experience, variously shaped as it is by our sets 
of religious concepts, is a cognitive response to the universal presence of the 
ultimate divine Reality that, in itself, exceeds human conceptuality. This Reality 
is however manifested to us in ways formed by a variety of human concepts, as 
the range of divine personae and metaphysical impersonae witnessed to in the 
history of religions. Each major tradition, built around its own distinctive way 
of thinking-and-experiencing the Real, has developed its own answers to the 
perennial questions of our origin and destiny, constituting more or less com-
prehensive and coherent cosmologies and eschatologies. These are human crea-
tions which have, by their association with living streams of religious experience, 
become invested with a sacred authority. However they cannot all be wholly 
true; quite possibly none is wholly true; perhaps all are partly true. But since 
the salvific process has been going on through the centuries despite this unknown 
distribution of truth and falsity in our cosmologies and eschatologies, it follows 
that it is not necessary for salvation to adopt anyone of them. We would therefore 
do well to learn to tolerate umesolved, and at present umesolvable, differences 
concerning these ultimate mysteries. 
One element, however, to be found in the belief-systems of most of the 
traditions raises a special problem, namely that which asserts the sole salvific 
efficacy of that tradition. I shall discuss this problem in terms of Christianity 
because it is particularly acute for those of us who are Christians. We are all 
familiar with such New Testament texts as 'There is salvation in no one else 
[than Jesus Christ], for there is no other name under heaven given among men 
by which we must be saved (Acts 4:12), and with the Catholic dogma Extra 
ecclesiam nulla salus (No salvation outside the church) and its Protestant equi-
valent-never formulated as an official dogma but nevertheless implicit within 
the 18th and 19th century Protestant missionary expansion,-no salvation outside 
Christianity. Such a dogma differs from other elements of Christian belief in 
that it is not only a statement about the potential relationship of Christians to 
God but at the same time about the actual relationship of non-Christians to God. 
It says that the latter, in virtue of being non-Christians, lack salvation. Clearly 
such a dogma is incompatible with the insight that the salvific transformation of 
human existence is going on, and so far as we can tell going on to a more or 
less equal extent, within all the great traditions. Insofar, then, as we accept that 
salvation is not confined to Christianity we must reject the old exclusivist dogma. 
376 Faith and Philosophy 
This has in fact now been done by most thinking Christians, though exceptions 
remain, mostly within the extreme Protestant fundamentalist constituencies. The 
Extra ecclesiam dogma, although not explicitly repealed, has been outflanked 
by the work of such influential Catholic theologians as Karl Rahner, whose new 
approach was in effect endorsed by Vatican II. Rahner expressed his more 
inclusivist outlook by suggesting that devout people of other faiths are 
'anonymous Christians,' within the invisible church even without knowing it, 
and thus within the sphere of salvation. The present Pope, in his Encyclical 
Redemptor Hominis (1979) has expressed this thought even more comprehen-
sively by saying that 'every man without exception has been redeemed by Christ' 
and 'with every man without any exception whatever Christ is in a way united, 
even when man in unaware of it' (para. 14). And a number of Protestant theolo-
gians have advocated a comparable position. 
The feature that particularly commends this kind of inclusivism to many Chris-
tians today is that it recognizes the spiritual values of other religions, and the 
occurrence of salvation within them, and yet at the same time preserves their 
conviction of the ultimate superiority of their own religion over all others. For 
it maintains that salvation, wherever it occurs, is Christian salvation; and Chris-
tians are accordingly those who alone know and preach the source of salvation, 
namely in the atoning death of Christ. 
This again, like the old exclusivism, is a statement not only about the ground 
of salvation for Christians but also for Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and 
everyone else. But we have seen that it has to be acknowledged that the immediate 
ground of their transformation is the particular spiritual path along which they 
move. It is by living in accordance with the Torah or with the Qur'anic revelation 
that Jews and Muslims find a transforming peace with God; it is by one or other 
of their great margas that Hindus attain to moksha; it is by the Eightfold Path 
that Theravada Buddhists come to nirvana; it is by zazen that Zen Buddhists 
attain to satori; and so on. The Christian inclusivist is, then. by implication. 
declaring that these various spiritual paths are efficacious. and constitute authentic 
contexts of salvation, because Jesus died on the cross; and. by further implication. 
that if he had not died on the cross they would not be efficacious. 
This is a novel and somewhat astonishing doctrine. How are we to make sense 
of the idea that the salvific power of the dharma taught five hundred years earlier 
by the Buddha is a consequence of the death of Jesus in approximately 30 C.E.? 
Such an apparently bizarre conception should only be affirmed for some very 
good reason. It was certainly not taught by Jesus or his apostles. It has emerged 
only in the thought of twentieth century Christians who have come to recognize 
that Jews are being salvifically transformed through the spirituality of Judaism. 
Muslims through that of Islam, Hindus and Buddhists through the paths mapped 
out by their respective traditions. and so on. but who nevertheless wish to retain 
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their inherited sense of the unique superiority of Christianity. The only outlet 
left for this sense, when one has acknowledged the salvific efficacy of the various 
great spiritual ways, is the arbitrary and contrived notion of their metaphysical 
dependency upon the death of Christ. But the theologian who undertakes to spell 
out this invisible causality is not to be envied. The problem is not one of logical 
possibility-it only requires logical agility to cope with that-but one of religious 
or spiritual plausibility. It would be a better use of theological time and energy, 
in my opinion, to develop forms of trinitarian, christological and soteriological 
doctrine which are compatible with our awareness of the independent salvific 
authenticity of the other great world faiths. Such forms are already available in 
principle in conceptions of the Trinity, not as ontologically three but as three 
ways in which the one God is humanly thought and experienced; conceptions 
of Christ as a man so fully open to and inspired by God as to be, in the ancient 
Hebrew metaphor, a 'son of God'; and conceptions of salvation as an actual 
human transformation which has been powerfully elicited and shaped, among 
his disciples, by the influence of Jesus. 
There may indeed well be a variety of ways in which Christian thought can 
develop in response to our acute late twentieth century awareness of the other 
world religions, as there were of responding to the nineteenth century awareness 
of the evolution of the forms of life and the historical character of the holy 
scriptures. And likewise there will no doubt be a variety of ways in which each 
of the other great traditions can rethink its inherited assumption of its own unique 
superiority. But it is not for us to tell people of other traditions how to do their 
own business. Rather, we should attend to our own. 
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